Defeat: Why America and Britain Lost Iraq

[Peter11216]

Defeat: Why America and Britain Lost Iraq

Jonathan Steele, Counterpoint 2008

There have been a plethora of books written about U.S. failures after the 2003 invasion. Steele adds another, but with a few important differences. First, he admits that the war was illegal. Second, he argues that for all the utterly idiotic mistakes Britain and America made, there was simply no way for the occupation to succeed, because of the very fact that it was an occupation. Personally, I think the conclusion is self-evident. Who on earth would tolerate foreign soldiers in their country and interfering with their daily lives? Nonetheless, Steele provides example piled onto example of ways in which the Iraqis will not tolerate having foreign soldiers run their lives.

He puts it this way: "My central argument has been that Washington's war planners, from the president and his closet advisers to the neoconservative academics who spurred them on, took no account of the nature of Iraqi society or Iraq's history, or indeed the deep well of Arab resentment throughout the region that would doom a Western occupation."

More or less, the vast majority of Iraq's population were happy to see Saddam ousted. However, as grateful as some Iraqis were, few wanted a foreign army to occupy the country.

Some of the planning failures are astounding. Neither the American nor British planners took any serious account of the internal structure of Iraqi society. Among the things that are surprising, especially considering U.S. policy in the region, was the fact that war planners failed to recognize close ties between Iran and the Islamicist Shia political groups in Iraq. Not surprisingly, these ties lead to greater Iranian influence in Iraq after the occupation.

Of the planning failures that are truly saddening was the assumption that Iraq was highly divided along sectarian lines, e.g. Kurdish north, Sunni middle, and Shia south. According to the many Iraqis Steele interviewed, the region of Iraq had a long history of comingling between Sunni and Shia, including a great deal of intermarriage. Many Iraqis considered their national identity more important than their religious identity. When Saddam was in power he attempted to use tribal and sectarian divisions, such as there were, to weaken any opposition. During the occupation the United States simply assumed the opposite, that Saddam had kept a lid on sectarianism. The United States then exacerbated the problem by playing Sunni against Shia, and vice versa.

This is a pretty short book. I think it is well worth the read. As I said, in a way I think the conclusion of the book is just common sense. Occupying armies will not be respected by the occupied. It's tough to imagine, but suppose a foreign army invaded and took over Washington D.C. - even if you absolutely hated the administration - what would be the response of the average American citizen? Smile and wave to the foreign tanks, or fight back? On this note, I suppose Iraq ought to be an inspiration to U.S. gun advocates. Most households have at least two weapons, the Kalishnikov being the most prevalent. Steele claims that the British triggered a major uprising because they tried to take people's guns away.

[image from "Captain's Journal," a blog I stumbled on while looking for pictures of Iraqis with Kalishnikovs.]

Best,

Pete

[bolivr]

Interesting post, thanks.

Such a waste. Lives and limbs lost, torture, irreplaceable antiquities lost or destroyed, essentially a breakdown of a society - for what?

[Rogers72]

Sounds like a good read. I agree with the premise that occupying forces can never really "win" but i think the jury is still very much out on whether or not the invasion and ensuing occupation was a mistake. I don't think you can call it a "loss" though. In fact, we may never know b/c who knows what Iraq would be like today or 10, 20 years from now if we had let things carry on as they were. I don't think that anyone can argue that Sadam was a very bad man and the world is a better place without him and his regime. I will certainly concede that many mistakes have been made along the way but i don't think that a short-term "win" was possible...probably not even a successful exit strategy. The question since the invasion has been "What now???". I don't think anyone has an easy answer. I think the best answer right now may be to get out but maintain a large coaltion base there (ie Ramstein, GITMO, Okinawa). Institute sweeping reforms to make the UN strong again and include the new middle eastern govts as vital parts of that. Hopefully, the people will get a taste of true democracy and capitalism and thrive in peace. That may be idealistic but most said it couldn't be done in postwar Japan and Germany either. If that is the end result, I think you can call it a smashing success.

[Peter11216]

Thanks for reading the review. I thought it might be worth noting that Steele does discuss some of the questions you raise. I think the book is pretty fair, as far as it goes. He does argue that the primary mistake was occupying Iraq after overthrowing Saddam. Most Iraqis were glad to see him go.

Number one: the occupation is or isn't a mistake depending on your goals. I think Steele and others present pretty convincing arguments that Iran gained influence after the invasion, and more so, because of the occupation. Two major political parties that emerged during the occupation were both heavily influenced by Islamicists who had fled Iraq, and were welcomed by Iran. Saddam was a secularist, and brutally suppressed the leaders of these groups. So, if you want to isolate Iran - the occupation, and maybe the invasion as well, are mistakes.

Number two: one of the reasons people in Iraq were not so grateful for the U.S. overthrowing Saddam was the fact that the U.S. and other western countries had put really f***ing harsh sanctions in place. Estimates of the number of people who died because of the sanctions are high. Steele says that Saddam wasn't hurt by these sanctions, but the population was. In fact, he used them to his advantage.

Thus, the average person in the street thought that part of the reason Saddam hadn't been ousted by his own people (after 1991) was the very fact that the U.S. and Britain were making them live hand to mouth - without diminishing Saddam's internal power to repress.

Steele also interviews Iraqis who blamed Bush Sr. for calling for the Shia population in the south to rise up against Saddam after the first Gulf War, and then allowing Saddam to use the no fly zone to put down the rebellion.

Thus, again, many Iraqis thought (correctly, if you ask me) that Saddam stayed in power because of actions taken by Washington and their junior partner London. (Kurds remember, too, that Saddam was a favorite of Washington after they were gassed and murdered.)

So - if the U.S. had simply stopped the sanctions, it is perfectly reasonable to think that Iraqis would have risen up on their own.

Number three: Steele deals with the comparison to Germany and Japan at some length. Apparently, many of the Washington planners thought they could model post-war Iraq on post-war Germany and Japan. There are lots of reasons why this was unlikely to work.

Anyways, excuse the needlessly long response. The book is good, short and a lot more interesting than I can convey.

Best,

pete

Sounds like a good read. I agree with the premise that occupying forces can never really "win" but i think the jury is still very much out on whether or not the invasion and ensuing occupation was a mistake. I don't think you can call it a "loss" though. In fact, we may never know b/c who knows what Iraq would be like today or 10, 20 years from now if we had let things carry on as they were. I don't think that anyone can argue that Sadam was a very bad man and the world is a better place without him and his regime. I will certainly concede that many mistakes have been made along the way but i don't think that a short-term "win" was possible...probably not even a successful exit strategy. The question since the invasion has been "What now???". I don't think anyone has an easy answer. I think the best answer right now may be to get out but maintain a large coaltion base there (ie Ramstein, GITMO, Okinawa). Institute sweeping reforms to make the UN strong again and include the new middle eastern govts as vital parts of that. Hopefully, the people will get a taste of true democracy and capitalism and thrive in peace. That may be idealistic but most said it couldn't be done in postwar Japan and Germany either. If that is the end result, I think you can call it a smashing success.